• Home /Exam Details (QP Included)>Main Exam>Optional Subject-Medical Group>Philosophy / W.B.C.S. Examination Notes On – Mimamsa Philosophy – Philosophy Notes.
  • W.B.C.S. Examination Notes On – Mimamsa Philosophy – Philosophy Notes.

    Jaimini (400 B.C.) was the author of the Mimamsa Sutra, and the founder of the Mimamsa system. Savarasvamin (300 A.D.) wrote a commentary called. Savara-Bhasya, in which he criticized the views of the different schools of Buddhism.Continue Reading W.B.C.S. Examination Notes On – Mimamsa Philosophy – Philosophy Notes.

    He started his views on the principal philosophical topics, and raised the Purva Mimamsa to the status of an independent system. Kumarila Bhatta (700 A.D.), the founder of the Bhatta school of Mimamsa, wrote Slokavartika, Tantravartika and Tuptika. Slokavartika has great philosophical importance.

    Sucarita Misra wrote a commentary entitled Kasika on ii. Parthassrathi Misra (900 A.D.) wrote a commentary known as Nyayaratnakara on it, Nyayaratnamala, Tantraratna, and Sastradipika. Vacaspati Misra (1000 A.D.) wrote Nyayakanika, a commentary on Mandana Misra’s (680-750 A.D.)

    Vidhiviveka, and Tattvabindu. Prabhakara Misra (700 A.D.), the founder of the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa, wrote a commentary entitled Brhati on Savara-Bhasya. Salikanatha Misra (800 A.D.), wrote a commentary known as Rjuvimalapancika on, Brhati and Prakaranapancika. The third school of Mimamsa was founded by Murari Misra whose works are lost.

    The Mimamsa is called the Purva Mimamsa, while the Vedanta is called the Uttara Mimamsa. The former is earlier than the latter in the sense that it deals with rituals, while the latter is concerned with knowledge. The performance of rituals leads to the knowledge of the reality.

    So the Purva Mimamsa, called the Mimamsa, is logically prior to the Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedanta, the former being concerned with Dharma, and the latter, with Brahman.

    The Mimamsa is called Karma Mimamsa. It mainly deals with the Vedic injunctions about rituals, the rules of interpre­tation of the texts, which remove the apparent contradictions among them, and harmonize them with one another, and the philosophical justification of the beliefs underlying ritualism.

    It believes in the reality of the external world, the reality of the individual souls, and the Law of Karma. It believes in transmigration, heaven and hell, and liberation. It believes in many Gods, who are worshipped through rejects the notion of one God, who creates, preserves and dissolves the world.

    It frankly advocates atheism and emphasizes the importance of ritualism. It believes in the eternality and infallibility of the Vedas and rejects their divine authorship.

    Kumarila regards a cognition as a means of valid know­ledge (pramana) because it is apprehension. Prabhakara also regards apprehension, which is distinct from recollection as a means of valid knowledge. Kumarila regards cognizednes (jnatata) produced by a cognitive act as its result.

    But Prabhatkara identifies pramana with valid knowledge (prama) and regards a cognition as manifesting itself, and not as inferable from cognizedness of its object.

    According to him, all cognitions as cognitions are valid, and their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves, but to the objects cognized. Kumarila also regards apprehension as valid knowledge, which can be set aside by its disagreement with the real nature of its object.

    He regards novelty, non­-contradiction and correspondence with the object as the tests of truth. He regards recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehended already by perception. Prabhakara also excludes recollection from valid knowledge, which is in the nature of apprehension.

    Kumarila recognizes the intrinsic validity and the extrinsic invalidity of knowledge. The validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. It does not arise from any special excellence in the causes of knowledge, and is not known by any other subsequent knowledge of fruitful action, or of the absence of a contradicting knowledge.

    Knowledge is valid in itself, and is not validated by any other knowledge. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions of the knowledge itself, and not by extraneous conditions besides them.

    The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same aggregate of causal conditions which make the knowledge known. But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge, and is known by the knowledge of them, and the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

    The Nyaya regards both validity and invalidity of know­ledge as extrinsic due to excellence and defects of the causes of knowledge, and determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action and a fruitless action respectively. Kumarila criticizes this view.

    If validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to extraneous conditions, then prior to the knowledge of its validity or invalidity, the knowledge would be neutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral knowledge, but only valid knowledge or invalid knowledge.

    If the validity of a knowledge depended upon the knowledge of excellence of its causes, or the knowledge of its agreement with its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action, then the validity of the second knowledge also would depend upon some other knowledge, and so on to infinity.

    If the second knowledge is valid in itself, the first knowledge also is intrin­sically valid. The Nyaya regards the validity of knowledge as due to the excellence of its causes. But the so-called excellence of the sense-organs and the like is not known through any means of valid knowledge. The validity of per­ception is generated by the essential nature of the sense-organs untainted by any defects, but not by any special excellence of them.

    If there were neutral knowledge, valid knowledge, and invalid knowledge, they would be due to the essential nature, excellence, and defects of its causes respectively. But, in fact, we experience only valid knowledge and invalid knowledge.

    Invalid knowledge arises from causes tainted with defects. So valid knowledge must be held to arise from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects. The invalidity of know­ledge is produced by a deficiency in its causes. It is held by some to be due to the knowledge of its deficiency, and not to its nature.

    The validity of knowledge cannot be determined by the knowledge of any special excellence in its cause, or the know­ledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action. It is determined by the knowledge itself.

    No special excellence of the causes of knowledge except their essential nature is perceived. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object.

    Validity or truth is harmony of a knowledge with the real nature of its object. The valid knowledge itself cognizes the real nature of its object by its very nature. It does not depend upon another knowledge of harmony to manifest its object, because it does not differ from the first knowledge. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action, for unless its validity is determined, it cannot determine the validity of the first knowledge.

    If it is determined by another knowledge of a fruitful action, it will lead to infinite regress. If-it is determined by the first knowledge, then there is mutual dependence: the validity of the first knowledge is determined by the second, and that of the second knowledge is determined by the first.

    If the latter is determined by itself, the former also should be regarded as determined by itself. Nor can the Validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting knowledge, since it cannot be exhaustively known by us, because we are not omniscient.

    Further, it is known either at the time of ascertaining the validity of a knowledge or at a subsequent time. It very often appears at a subsequent time, and hence the knowledge of it cannot determine the validity of an antecedent knowledge Hence valid knowledge is produced by the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects and, known by itself. Invalid knowledge is produced by causes tainted with defects, and known by the knowledge of the defects or the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

    Kumarila recognizes six pramanas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non-apprehension. Prabhakara rejects negation as an independent category, and non-apprehension as the means of knowing it.

    Jaimini defines perception as the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense-organs with existing objects. It is produced by real objects existing at present and acting upon the sense-organs. When there is a right intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, valid perception is produced.

    Kumarila says, “Right intercourse is the intercourse of the sense-organs untainted by defects with real objects.” Illusions are produced by wrong intercourse. The Mimamsa theory of perception is similar to the Nyaya theory. Only the latter regards the auditory organ as ether limited by the ear-hole, while the former regards it as space limited by the ear-hole.

    The Prabhakara defines perception as direct apprehension which relates to an object, the self, and cognition.

    In every perception of an object, the self, the cognition, and the object are perceived. This is Prabhakara’s doctrine of triple percep­tion. In regard to objects, there is the perception of subs­tances, qualities, and universals due to the intercourse of the sense-organs with them.

    Cognitions are self-manifest. But the self and an object are not self-manifest, but are manifested by a cognition, which is self-aware and which is not manifested by any other cognition.

    Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognize two stages of perception, viz., indeterminate perception and determinate perception. Kumarila defines indeterminate perception as simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, similar to the apprehension of a baby or a dumb person.

    It apprehends neither the specific characters nor the generic characters, but an individual object only, which is their substrate. It cannot apprehend the generic characters as generic and the specific characters as specific.

    Prabhakara defines indeterminate perception as a simple apprehension of the bare nature of an object. It apprehends a substance, a quality, and a genus as bare existences unrelated to each other just after the sense object-intercourse.

    Its exist­ence is proved by its self-awareness. It apprehends generic characters and specific characters, but it cannot cognize them as generic and specific, since it is devoid of recollection of other similar and dissimilar objects.

    Kumarila defines determinate perception as apprehension of the generic characters of an object as generic, and of its specific characters as specific. It contains an element of recollec­tion of similar and dissimilar objects, and apprehends the community of its object with other similar objects and its distinction from other dissimilar objects. It apprehends an object and its generic and specific properties in a subject predicate relation.

    Prabhakara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic characters and the specific characters of an object as generic and specific respectively. It apprehends its object and its properties in a subject-predicate relation.

    It apprehends its object as a subs­tance endued with particular qualities and belonging to a cer­tain genus. It contains an element of recollection produced by subconscious impressions. It is immediate apprehension produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by subconscious impressions.

    Kumarila recognizes the validity of indeterminate and determinate perception both. Indeterminate perception reveals the bare nature of an object. It is direct apprehension or distinct cognition of an object in itself, unrelated to other objects.

    Its validity consists in its directness and immediacy; it yields new knowledge not acquired already. Though it is devoid of subject-predicate relation, it is valid. Determinate perception also is valid, since it is direct and immediate knowledge of an object and its properties as related to each other, which is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by subconscious impressions.

    Prabhakara also regards indeter­minate perception as valid, since it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection, and since its validity is proved by self-awareness. He regards determinate perception also as valid, because it apprehends the subject-predicate relation between its object and its properties, substance, quality and genus, which is not apprehended by indeterminate perception.

    Savara defines presumption as the assumption of an un­perceived fact without which inconsistency among perceived facts cannot be reconciled. If we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is absent from his house, we cannot reconcile his being alive with his non-existence in his house, unless we assume his existence outside his house. The assump­tion of this unperceived fact which reconciles two apparently inconsistent well-known facts is presumption. It is also called postulation or implication.

    Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other in their views on presumption. Prabhakara maintains, that there is an element of doubt in presumption. While Kumarila denies its existence in it. There is doubt, according to Prabhakara, as to the truth of the two perceived facts which cannot be reconciled with each other. The assumption of another fact removes the doubt, and reconciles the apparently inconsistent facts.

    We know that Devadatta is living, and perceive his absence from his house. This perception generates a doubt about our knowledge that he is living. In order to remove this doubt we assume that he must be outside his house. This presumption removes the doubt as to his living, and reconciles the two apparently inconsistent facts of his living and non-existence in his house.

    The element of doubt, according to Prabhakara, disting­uishes presumption from inference. There is no element of doubt in inference. From the undoubted perception of smoke we can infer the existence of fire. The sign is free from doubt.

    But the perceived absence of Devadatta from his house leads to the presumption of his living outside his house only when it has made the fact of his living doubtful. Thus there is doubt in presumption, while there is no doubt in inference. Presump­tion removes doubt, and reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts, and cannot be regarded as inference.

    Please subscribe here to get all future updates on this post/page/category/website

    Leave a Reply

    Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

    This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

     WBCS Foundation Course Classroom Online 2024 2025 WBCS Preliminary Exam Mock Test WBCS Main Exam Mock Test WBCS Main Language Bengali English Nepali Hindi Descriptive Paper